The Syrian civil war was remarkable for many reasons, but among them is the sheer number of overlapping intelligence agendas playing out in the context of the war. It’s very hard to accurately assess the influence of these organizations due to their highly secretive nature. We can, however, identify certain dynamics and whose interests they serve, and consider the incentives of certain players to promote certain tendencies.

One of the strategies that occurred in Syria, whether deliberately engineered or not, was the presence of a baited trap. The direction that ISIS took during the Syrian civil war had many of the characteristics of an effective trap, whether or not it was actually engineered to be one. The ideology of the group limited its ability to integrate with the local population, which in turn reduced the political backlash of using airstrikes and artillery to conduct outright massacres. The group’s public executions and openly antagonistic attitude toward the “international community” also further gave a free pass for the American military and its allies to kill without restraint.

At the same time, an image was projected of an Islamic paradise, with high quality media and soundtrack, and Muslims everywhere were called to come and join. More than just being invited, they were told it was their spiritual obligation to come, and threatened with hellfire for not joining. The ideology is very attractive to the extent of being utopian; a vision of a perfect Islam, free from any compromise, and the promise of a state which defends oppressed Muslims everywhere. This is the “bait.” Tens of thousands of Muslims did answer the call, and were then systematically killed over a period of a few years. Most of the remainder were imprisoned and are now used by journalists, academics and psychologists for research and propaganda purposes.

If we consider who this harms, we can understand who it benefits. For one, it drained significant strength from Shia in the region, who mobilized on a large scale due to the Islamic State’s intense anti-Shia stance. At the same time, it acted as a “pressure release” for thousands of Muslims who otherwise might have opposed the states that they were living in and caused problems, but who could not be easily eliminated in countries with rule of law. Many countries grapple with the problem of what to do with “radicalized” citizens. If they are left free, they could conduct “lone wolf” attacks. If they are imprisoned without cause, it could cause a human rights outcry. If they are imprisoned for any reason, they can spread their ideas to other prisoners, multiplying the problem for these oppressive states. Gathering a large number of them from around the world and massacring them is a dream come true for the custodians of the international system.

An ultra-violent splinter group also has the benefit of diluting the ranks of other Islamic insurgent groups and weakening them. In an ordinary group, there are those who incline towards fighting and those who incline towards political methods. These two tendencies ideally balance each other out— the diplomatic group acts as a check and balance against the more militant side, while the militant side prevents excessive pacifism or compromise.

By causing the defection of more militant members of other Muslim groups, the remaining groups are left in a state where they are more willing to compromise, making them less of a threat and causing them to lose both effectiveness and credibility. At the same time, the more militant groups are also easier to target with conventional military means, because high levels of violence lead to weak political positioning.

The end result of this strategy is that the kuffar neutralize the movement. On one side, there are groups which are convinced to abandon jihad by granting concessions within democratic and nationalist systems. On the other hand, there are groups that are strategically and politically much easier to control because of their lack of political strategy and alienation from the broader public.

It’s impossible to say if this dynamic is deliberately engineered or not; however, it certainly exists. In any case, it’s very important to strive to resist this polarization. To achieve this, it’s necessary to cultivate patience in giving and receiving advice, respecting differences of opinion, and for the younger generation to be patient and wait for their turn for leadership.

Even if the leadership makes mistakes, these mistakes will in all likelihood be less severe in harm than the harm of division and internal conflict. Elders may see something that younger generations don’t, and even if they do make a mistake, when the turn comes for the younger generation to take over leadership, they will have more experience and understanding to implement their vision. And Allah is with the patient.